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TIM D TLO7.2'71T OF THE 7LLO'W SERVANT DOCTRILi'.
---0oo---
In order to h~rvo ncoriorehurs5vo and adequrte vier of
the subject of follow servant or co-employee liability it is
essential at the outset to examine t .o law applicatle to the
relation of master and servant in the different stagea of its
development: and in such an examination one needs not a micro-
scope but a field glass and a corzanding height.
In looking at the annals of the early Roman Law one must
I necessarily be impressed by the logic and brevity of its
maxims. Evidence of their clearness and conciseness is seen
in the fact that they have withstood the wavering changes of
over fifteen centuries and we still find many of them embodied
in the works of modern text writers and in the decisions of
our courts.
Perhaps the most striking of the r:axirts found in the
early Roman jurisprudence is the maxim "Respondeat Superior",
while closely analogous a:A apparently b'it a broader statement
of the same princiVple is the maxin "10,ui facit :-or alitmol fceit
per so."
The ifiaxhir "Reslondeat Suorior" according to Kent orig-
inated in teo early stagos of tho Ronan civilization, and
dates back to that period in the Roman law when all servants
were slaves, for whom the pater-familias was responsible as a
part of his general responsibility for the family whiab ho
represented and governed. This maxim was introduced into
the.rM*lish law about the time of Charles II.
The relation of master and servant'arises out of con-
tract either express or implied and is analogous and similar
to that of principal and agent; the difference between the
two-consisting only in the nature of the employment, and the
extent of the authority. Every servant acting in the exer-
cise of the master's business, and within the scope of his
employment represents the master himself, and his acts are,
in contemplation of lawthe acts of the master.
It seems however that a wrong impression has at times
more or less obtained, and still exists to a certain extent,
that the same legal principles as to the master's liability
ought to apply to cases of injuries by a servant to a servant,
and to cases of injuries by a servant to a stranger,or to the
public. Due reflection will show however that the two re-
lations are entirely different, and the rules of law 'regard.
Ing the employee's liability to one servant for the default
of a co-servant, not only are, but for the last fifty years
have been different from those relating to t'e master's lia-
bility to those not in his employment, for the acts Qf his
servant s.
According to the weight of the American and English
authdrities; ItThe master i~s liable to persons not in his
service, not omly for his own wrongful acts and omissions ,
but also for the wrongful acts and omissions of his servants
while acting in the scope and course of their omployment as
such, even though the particular acts or omissions were not
only unauthorized but even fqcrbidden; and resulted in loss
and amage to him irrespective of the claims of the person
injured." But in as far as this rule irayoses.on the
master an imputed liability, that ist, a liability beyond his
authorized acts, and defaults or a liability for faults and
omissions he did not approve, authorize, or direct- but even
forbid' it is one of manifest severity, is not based on nat-
ural J.nstice and is to be held justifiable only on the grounds
of public policy or of social duty.
The reasons for the master's liability for the acts of
his servants to the pubIic, or to strangers, can be based
upon either one of two gronds; one of which is that the mas-
ter is bound to guarantee; third persons from all harm or
damage arising from the negligenco oC hirasolf, or those acting
under his authority, or in tho, course Qf his busilness: but it
seems the better rule to waive the reasoning of such a con-
stru tivo guarranty, and adopt the better conclusion that he
who puts into operation an agency which he controls while he
receives its emoluments, must be held responsible for the
injuries which it incidentally infliots. The business of
"the masetr ts as respects the public, conducted for his own
Ikdvantage and oonvenience, the public have no conqern in it,
are not coniulte1 abolit it.and have no control over it or its
methods' and if the busInbss' is' a lawful one as for example
a railroad built and operated under legislative authority,
the master although he ts not bound to guarantao the public
against accidents or domages, is still bound to take reason-
able care either by himself or t1rough those who represent
hlm, to -prevent accidents and damages and he is- liable for
his servant's negligence, not siniply because they are his
servants, but because an resj-ects the public he is bound tb
conduct his business with due care and. caution so as not to
injure or damage the rights Of others: because having for his
own convenience, pleasure, or profittxpose;Dtho public to
risk of damages, if damages result either th-rou1-h his fault
or thrqUgh the fault of his sorvants, thie master will be held
liable.
. The ancient rule of IrRespondeat Suirfurior" was applied
without exception from its origin in the early Roman law un-
til the year 1341. But with the rapid growth of manufact-
uring, mining, and railroad enterprises; cmae.increasing
liability and responsibility for accidents arising from the
bad management of officers and agents, the insufficiency and
incompetency of workmen, and the methods of doing business;
the liabilities involved in the employment of thousands of
employees in large manufacturing centers, and on lines of
great railway companies, exposed at all times to manifold
risks and dangers gave rise to the feeling in the courts that
it operated unjustly to the large industrial enterprises, and
that the relation of master and servant in its true sense was
ixapplicable to the situation; for between employer and em-
plotee it became more and more difficult to apply the or-
dinary common law principles governing the relation of master
and servant, to t'he imore complicated methods of business
enterprise.
In the year 1837 the case of Priestly v Fowler, 3 M. & W.I.
arQse in the English courts, it being the first recorded
exception to the ancient rule of "Respondeat Superior",.and
the general principles of the law governing the relation os
master and servant. Beach in his work on "Contributory Weg-
ligencoe" says of it; "The decision of this case constitutes a
clear exception from which has flowed in a copious flood all
the modern law as to follow servants and common employment,
and it is not extravagant to say that the decision in its.in-
fluenct upon subsequent jurisprudence is secodd to no adjudi-
cation to be found in the reports; no other reported case has
changed the current of decision more radically then this, and
subsequent reports and text ,books contain limitations and re-
finements on the doctrine here for the first time announced.*
The facts of the case were as follows; a butcher sent
one of his servants to deliver meat in a wagon which had been
overloaded by another servant, the wagon broke down and the
man received severe injuries. The court decided that the
butcher was not liable to the servant for the injuries so
received. This case howevor does not plainly show exactly
whose negligence was the cause of the injury; that is whether
it was due directly to the overloading, or was duo to some
material defect in the wagon itself. The decision however
seems to have been based for the most part on the Fround that
the non-application of such a rule would be to carry out the
principle of the master's liability to an alarming extent.
Lord Abinger giving the opinion of the court says; "If
the master is to be held liable in this action the -principle
of that liability will be found to carry us to an alarming
extent. If the owner of a carriage is responsible for the
'deficiency of tbo carriage to his servants he is responsible
for the negligence of his coach-maker,his harness-maker and
his coachman. The master would thereby also be liable to
the servant -for the negligence of the chambermaid in puting
him into a damp bed or for the negligence of the cook in
not properly cleaning the etensils of the kitchen; but the
inconvenience not to say the absurdity of these consequences
is-obvious." Again in the opinion Lord Abingor says, "The
master is only bound to provide for his servants to the best
of his judgment, information, and belief; while the servant
on the other hand is not bound to risk his safety in the em-
ployment of his master but may if he sees fit decline any
service in which he reasonably apprehends injury." The case
decides that a servant upon entering into the employment of
his master assumes the risks of such employment.
A few years later in the year 1850 the case of Hutchin-
son v The Now York, Now Castlo and Berwia R.R. Co. 5 Ex. 343
arose in England. This case arising upon a clearer state-
ment of facts and more definitely stating the law, has been
held, although a later oase than Priestly v Fowler to be tie
leading English case izj-on the subject. In th1is case a fire-
man was injured through t-io negligence of an engineer and Br-
on Alderson said in the opinion given by the court, "Where
several servants are employed by the sarw riaster and inj1ry
results to one of them from t4he negligence of another, in
such a case we are of the opinion that the marster is not
generally liable where he has selocted persons of reasonable
caro and skill." and again in his opinion he states the prin-
ciple as follows, "A servant when he undertol-es to' serve a
master undertakes as between himself and his master to run
all the ordinary risks of the employment, including the risk
of negligence on the d.art of a fellow servant whenever he is
acting In the discharge of his duty as servant of him who
is the cot-on master of both. This case in the prLicipo
which it enznciates hvs Leer followed again Fnd again In the
numeroua cases which have since arisen under the English law.
The first rolorto acse upion this continent arose In
Iorth Carolina in 1841 throe years after Priestly v Fowler had
been decided by the Engl1oh courts. It is also.aip-areza,
strange though it soorx, that the Ncrth Cr'rolina court did
not have the epse of Priestly v Fowler oforo them nor does
$he record show thait they hA ever hoard of it, and so we.
fin# this doctrin enunciated by the Judicial authorities of
both Zngland and Atlerica, -'t or about tho, sEat tirio and each
decided. indepenfiently of th other.
The North Carolina case L'urray v South Carolina R.R. Co.
is reported in 2 I-.c Millips rel.orts. In this case upon a
locomotive owned and operated by tho defendent corporation,
while in the performance of his duties, the plaintiff was in-
Jured owing,to the carelessness and negligence of the engin-
eer in-refusing to stop after his attention had been called to
an obstacle upon the trackz. Judge Evans delivering the opin-
ion of the court in this case in substance says, "It is by
no means incident to the contract of service that the com-
pany should guarantee its servants against the negligence of
co-servants.
It is adnittod that the servant tak.s- upon hiisolf the
ordinary risks of his ployinent. Thy not the extraordinary
ones ? Neither are within the contract and I can see no
reason for adding the already k.oTm and acKncwlvC6ed liability
of a oornron carrier to the fpcts of this case without a single
anthority or doctsion to susti'In such a holding."
The counsel for tho plnintiff rou1ht to hold the com-
pany on the groun-I that tho .irurian was ; -'assengrr, Judge in
Evans in conilusion renprks; ; servant in his department
represents his Irtlnio.l, t",w uiccessful resylt of their
labors comes from the fact that each performs his several
duties. And it seems to re that it is on the part of the
several agents a joint undertalting,.whore each one stipulates
for the Performance of his several part. They are not lia-
ble to the company for the misconduct of each other, nor is
the company liable to. one for the misconduct of another: and
as a general rule I would say that where there is no fault
on the part of the master he would be liable to the servants
only for their rages."
But in the next year 1342 there arose in the Supreme
Court of Massachusutts the celebrated case of rarwelll v B. &
W. LR.Co., 4 7.etcalf 40. The learninrg and logic of the
opinion delivered by Chief Justice Shamwin this case has made
it as has been justly said the fountain-head for all subse-
quent decisions upon .this ,.otnt. it has been found again
and again, and cited with aproval by both the English and
American courts evorit ,ps first Rnnoimcod. The facts of
this case were as follows, an engineor was injured throuih
the negllgence of a switchman who left the mwitch o-en s6
that the engine ran ofi7 the track and injured the I-laintiff.
It was shown that the switcahan was a cartdfull and trustwor-
thy servant; the engineer Farwell sued the railroad oomany
and it was hold that he could not recover. In this case no
actual negligence was alleged eEpinst the company, but the
basis of the claim was a supposed imIlied contract by the
master to pay one ser/ant for the damages caused to him
through the hegligence of another. The coiurt however hold-
ing that no such implied contract existed. Chief Justice
Shaw in delivering the opinion of the aourt said; "The gon-
oral rale resulting from considerations of justice as well as
policy is that he'who engages In the employment of another,
for the performance of specified duties and services for com-
Wnsation, takes upon hir.zel ' the natural and ordinary risis
and perils incident to the performance of sych services, and
in legal pres=irrption the compensation is adjusted accordingly;
and we are not aware of any ri_,n1ple il-ich should except the
perils arising from the carelessness and ngligence of those
who are in the same employttent. These are perils about which
the servant Is as likely .to know, and agpinst which he can as
effectually gzard as the master, they are perils incident to
the service and which can be as distinctly forseen and pro-
vided for in the rate of cozrapensation as any others."
FLrther in the opinion Chief Juisti o .Shaw says; 0 Besides
it appears to us that the arm~gent rests upon an assumed
principle of responsibility which does not In fact exist, the
master is not exempt from liability because the servant has
better rneans of p.roviding for his own safety when he is em-
ployed in imedlate connection with those from whose.negli-
gence he iight suffer, but because the imlilied contract does
not extend to inde=ify the servant aga'inst the negligence of
anyone but the master himself. The exeorn.tion therefore of
the master from liability for the negligence of a fellow ser-
vant, does not depend exclusively upon the consideration that
the servant has better means to provide for his own safety,
but upon other grcnds. hence the separation of the employ-
ment into difforent depnrtments cannot create that liability
when it does not arise from expross or implied contract, or
from a responsibility created by law to third persons and
strangers, for the negligence of a servant."
Since these early and leading cases were decided, the
doctrine that a rristor whether a corporation or a private In-
dividual, where no negligence is attributable is not liable
to a servant for the Injuries or dsmmCgos caused by the neg-
ligonce or carelessrnss of a follow servant has been decided
by the courts 1both of the American and English cont inots
till it can be said to be a i~ractically undils]utod principle
of the law. But the fact as to what constotutes fellow ser-
vice or co-eploy.rent; and who are fellow servants or co-e-
ployoee, Is still one regarding which the courts are widel#
and irreconcilably at variance; consequently we have to the
general fellow servant rule as adopted by the courts of the
different states various exceptions.
The firstand what is probably the most important of the
exceptions to the general rule is what is known as the Al~er-
ior servant or the si-eprior officer doctrine. This limitat-
ion or doctrine is based upon the theory that there is a dis-
tinction between servants exercising no supervision over
others engaged with them in the same erqloyment, and those
who are clothed, with the control and i:&-agnagement of a distinct
departnent, in which their duty is that of direction and
superintendence. This doctrine deals altogether with the
station or position which the two -loyues ocirljy, and over-
looks the character of tho act out of the negligence p1 erform-
ance or non-performance of whtah the injury arose. Beach in
his work on "Contributory Negligence" defines this limitation
as follows. "Where the negligent servant is in his grade of
employment suprlior to the injured servant, or where one ser-
vant is placed by the emp.loyeo in a position of subordination
and subject to the orders and contrdl of another, in such a
way and to such an extent that the servant so placed in con-
trol may reasonably be regarded as representing the mmster,
as his alter ego, when such inferior servant without fault and
while in the discharge of h~s duty is injured by the negli-
gence of the sperior servant, the master is liable in dami-
ages for the Injury.
This doctrine arose in an early Ohio case, the Little
Xaima R.R.Co. v Stevens, from the opinlon in which case the
above quotation from Beach seems to have been taken.
In considering this lirmi.tation Judge Shaw in the early
Farwell case said- "To say that the master shall be liable
because the damage is caused by his agents is assuing the
very point to be proved; they are his agents to some extent
and for some pur-poses,but whether he is responsible In a per-
ticular case for their iigoic F Fi not decided by the fact
that they are for some purposes his agents." This limitat-
ion although followed in a few.of the southern and western
states is far outweighod by the weight of authority against
it. A ease decided in the Unitod States Supreme Court in
1884 known as the Ross case 112 U.S. 377, were an engineer
was injured through the negligence of a conductor the court
held the railroad company liable following the superior ser-
vant limitation. But a few years later in the Baugh case
reported in 120 U.1. where a fireman was injured through the
negligence of an engineer who under the special rules of the
company, in the absence of a regular conductorwas acting as
conductor: in this case the court held the railway company
no lliable: and the court in its decision although attempting
to distinguish the Ross case which it seemed practically ill-
possible to do on any grounds,from the facts of this case*but
in the reasoning of the court as given in the opinion of
Chief Justice Fuller there was a strong inclination to break
away from the superior servant rule as laid down in the Ross
case: as the following quotations from the opinion will show
will show; "It is true" the court says "that the fact that
one servant is given control over another does not destroy
the relation of fellow servants, as the inquiry in such cases
must always be directed to the real powers and duties of the
offioial and not simply to the name given to the off iee.t
Again in the course of te opinion Justice Fuller says: "Prima
facie all who enter into the employ of a single master are
engaged in a common service, and are fellow servants, and
some other line of demarcation than that of mere control must
exist to destroy the relation of fellow servants." It will
be seen from these quotations that if the Ross case was dis-
tinguished, and not clearly overruled; it was distinguished
in such a manner that it will not again be followed in that
tribunal. The superior servant limitation at present is
followed only in the following states, Ohio, Rentuckey,
Georgia, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Tennessee and
Virginia.
The second limitation urpon the general follow servant
doctrine is what is known as tho de artment or onsgoeiation
doctrine. This doctrine arises from the fact that in imany
large enterprises the necessities of industry have led to a
division of labor into different departments. Thus the rule
has sprung up in a few of the states of this country that in
order to constitute servants of the semne naster,follow ser-
vants, it is essential that they should be either actually
cooperating at the tiM, of thu injitry, in the particular bus-
Iness at hand, or that thir usual duties should bring them
into habitual consociation so that proper care would be likely
to result. Re-::p cting this doctrine Chief Justice Shaw in
the early Parwell case "Wid; 'hen the objOct to be accom-
plished is one And the u, 6nJ tho m'-i:,loyurs are the same,
and the severpl jersons employed derive their compensation
and authority from the same source: it would be extremely
difficult,to distinguish what constitutes one department and
what a distinct dupartrnt' of ditty. It would vary with the
circumstances of every case :ttf it were made to depend upon
the nearness or remoteness of the persons fro* each other,
I
the question would imediatoly ariso,how near or how distant
must they be and yet be in tae sane department. In a black-
smith shop persons working in the.samae 'building at different
fires may b; quito independent of e-ach other, though only a
few feet distant. In the construction of a roPe walk several
may be at work on the same piece of cording at the same time,
many h.udred feet distant from each other and beyond the
reach of sight and votco yet acting together." The language
of Chief Justice Shaw in this case lucidly states the object-
ion to this doctrine.
It is obvioiv.ly i racticable to try and guage tho lia-
bi -%InF -s s,
bility of an employer In con .°ocxby the indQpenderco of it
different branchos, or the intur-eomunicatlon of those em-
ployed, for not only would it be almost iiaiossible in many
oasos to separate the work into distinct departments, and to
discern their dividing lines, but Incide-rtal duties changing
the reipticn of the u-orkron to oach other would also vary the
mast^,r's liability. le would thus be liabla for the negli-
gence of the servant at one time and place and not at another,
so that without a perarsonal srru'rvision of all his servants in
all their work, he could not lnow when he was rosionsible
and when he wps not. It is -klain that such a distinction
must manifestly result in ndloes confusion,as is illustrated
by the situation of the law in a few states which have ad-
opted this doctrine. This doctrine now exists in Indiana to
a limited extent, and in the states of Illinois, Georgia,
Kentuckey,and Ten'o-esseu. The courts of Tennessae have ap-
plied tbis doctrine in its strictest and fullest sense.
The third doctri-:; if it can be called a distinct doe-
trine is what is known as tho vice Tr ncial doctrine, which
is but a limited application of the suirTfrior officer doctrine.
This doctrine is based o the fact that the master owes to
his servants certain -porttivo dnttes which may be stated as
follows:
lot The master in bonmn to furnt.h all his sorvants
with a safe and suitable pl~co in which to work.
9nd. Thto mttr is boun to iv- -'i' car,- and diligence
in the selection Rnd retention of sufficient and competent
servants.
3rd. The master is boumd to supply his employees with
safe and suitable nachinery, tools, and appliances, and also
to keep such machinery In a safe and serviceable condition,
and to this end he i-mist raku- all needed tnsi]uct ion.
4th. It is also the duty of the master to make and pub-
lish such regulations, and provisions for the safety of em-
ployees as will afford themr reasonable protection against the
domages incident to th, perforriance of the 1'-rformance of
their resactive duties.
Those are tho certain defined y;,rsonal duties which the
master owes to hit zervants and if the ri.asto, r deligates any
one of these so-called personal duties, the person to whom
they are so delegated is known as a vice vrincijal and for
his negligent or careless acts the master is h-d liable.
This seems to be the true rnle and crttrion of follow service,
To be sure, under this rule it i. pbsolitoly es'.n~ial that
the injured um!;loyeo, and the cri!.!oycu whoro ,giiuco caused
the injury should -,.- Eorvants of the rurastor. By this
rule we have In every case a crucial test, and a determin ing
criterion from which to judge.
The true test undr.,r this rule as to whethor an oriltloyee
ocupies the position of a fellow servant to another amlloyee
or is the representitive of the master is to be found not in
the grade or rank of the offonding or inJitred servant, but
must in every .aso lo ) dtermintid by the character of the act
being :erformed bv the offun.ing servant by which the ether
employee is Injured: that is, whethor the person whose status
is in question is charged with the :,erfornmance of a duty which
properly belongs to the master; if so then he is but the agent
of the master for that -iur-jose and tho; rules of principal and
agent apply.
This doctrine h.as been announced and followed by mar of
the most able courts of this country. In the state of New
York this has been considered the p-roper tost. In Flike v
Boston R.R.Co., 5Z IT.Y. 504, Judgo Chirrch said, "The true
rule I apprehend is to hold tho corpcration liab2e for neg-
ligence in respect to such acts and duties as it is required
to )rform Rs master, without regard to the rank or title of
the agent tntrnsted With their .perforntanoe. As to sueh acts
the agent occuites the place of the corporation and the latter
is liable for the manner in Which they are -.urforT-ed".
And later tn Irts i. v Bmbbit, 81 N.Y. 51c, Judge Rapallo
stated the rule ?s fol*o': os, "The liability of the r.aster is
thus made to depend upon the character of the act In the
performance of which the injury arises without regard to the
rank of the employo, performing it. If it is one pertaining
to the duty the master oues to his servants he is responsible
to them for the nrnr.er of its 1,orfornance."
Thus it would seem, that imder the jurtice of this rule
the Aster's liability is precisely coiv-nt-i;ruratu with the
master's personal duties towards hls servants, and as to the
servant who in the p;?erforrnance of these duties represents the
master he can only be a vice -irincaipl for whose acts and ne-
glects the master is liable; beyond this tho eaniloyer is lia-
ble only for his own -, -rsonal negligence.
This is a -,lain, sound, se, and ' racticsl line of die-
tinction; one can easily find it and define it; it begins and
ends with the personal duties of th rstor, and any attuxt
to refine it bas#d u-cn tho notion of grades in tho service
or whPit in much the same thing distinct deprtxments in the
service wll only bring Rbout the confusion of the Ohio,
Tennessee, and 1entuckey experiments; hose courts have con-
strutted * labyrinth in which the jitdges who made it seem to
be able "to find no end irn the -Rndering .i~azes lost".
--- THE EID---
